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Abstract 
 
The Cooperative Principle was the organizing principle in Grice‟s pragmatics.  More 
recently, cooperation has played a reduced role in pragmatic theory.  The principle 
has been attacked on the grounds that people are not always or generally cooperative.  
One response to that objection is to say that there are two kinds of cooperation and 
Grice‟s principle only applies to the narrower kind, which concerns linguistic or 
formal cooperation.  I argue that such a distinction is only defensible if it is accepted 
that linguistic cooperation can be determined by an extra-linguistic goal.  To make 
distinctions among types of cooperation is helpful but this strategy does not remove 
all concerns about speakers who are not fully cooperative and in particular the 
operation of the principle needs to be qualified in situations of conflict of interest.  I 
propose that the principle, once qualified, can have a significant continuing role in 
pragmatic theory. 
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1. Conversational implicature and the cooperative principle 
 
Here is one of Grice‟s (1989: 32) original examples of conversational implicature.  A 
is a stranded motorist and B a passer-by. 
A: I am out of petrol. 
B: There is a garage round the corner. 
In Grice‟s account, B conversationally implicates that the garage may be open and 
may have petrol to sell. What that means is that B in some sense implies that, though 
does not explicitly say that, and nor do her remarks logically imply it.  Grice‟s 
explanation of the generation and detection of such implicatures depends on a 
fundamental principle.  “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at 
the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange 
in which you are engaged.  One might label this the COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE.” (Grice, 
1989: 26) 
 
The main idea is that the audience is able to interpret the speaker‟s remarks based on 
the assumption that she is following this principle.  That is, the assumption allows the 
audience to detect what the speaker is conversationally implicating but not explicitly 
saying.  The spirit is that the audience could in principle reason, “If the speaker is 
cooperating she must really be intending to convey …”  The audience  arrives at what 
the speaker is saying and uses that in conjunction with the assumption of 
cooperativeness, various kinds of contextual information and background knowledge 
to work out what the speaker is conversationally implicating (Grice, 1989: 31). Grice 
maintains a keen interest in what the speaker is intending, which reflects his work on 
the theory of meaning, which is based in speakers‟ intentions, a point emphasized by 
Saul (2002).  She opposes the approach of the Relevance Theorists, who she describes 
as taking Grice to be developing a theory of audience interpretation (Wilson and 
Sperber, 1981).  In particular, Saul attacks Wilson and Sperber‟s (1981: 156) claim 
that “what is said is the proposition the utterance is taken to express.”  Saul is surely 
right to point out that the audience make be mistaken about what is said.  But Wilson 
and Sperber are right to attribute an account of audience interpretation to Grice, even 
if he did not envisage the kind of cognitive theory they develop.  His theory refers 
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both to the speaker‟s intention and the process by which the audience is able to work 
it out.  Part of that process is to determine what the speaker said, even if a mistake can 
arise at that point.  Both speaker and audience are on centre stage and knowledge that 
each have about the other‟s mental processes is part of the picture (Grice, 1989:31).  
Sperber and Wilson (1986: 19-20) attack the view that mutual knowledge is ever 
achieved between speaker and hearer and the view that decoding is part of the 
communicative process.  Even so, their view is overtly inspired by Grice in central 
respects and leads to a focus on the speaker‟s communicative intentions, which they 
describe as  „ostensive-inferential‟ (Sperber and Wilson, 1986: 63), alongside their 
focus on the audience‟s cognitive processes that interpret such intentions.  
 
The cooperative principle is elaborated by Grice, as is well known, in terms of 
maxims under the four headings of quantity, quality, relation and manner, containing 
various sub-maxims.  For example, in the dialogue above about the petrol, B‟s remark 
about the petrol station is only relevant if B does indeed believe it may be open and 
have petrol to sell.  If A takes B to be cooperating then A will take B to be following, 
amongst others, the maxim of relation (Be relevant!), which allows A to attribute that 
implicature.  Here is Grice‟s reasoning behind his introduction of the cooperative 
principle.  He says,  “… our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of 
disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did.  They are 
characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant 
recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of common purposes, or 
at least a mutually accepted direction.” (Grice, 1989: 26) 
 
In attempting to define and explain his notion of conversational implicature, Grice is 
interested in an account of the coherence or unity of conversations at a rational level 
and when he says „disconnected‟ he means disconnected at a rational level.  There are 
various kinds of ways in which conversations may be attributed form and structure 
and thus in some sense be connected or disconnected.  For example, there can be 
explanations of the process of turn taking (Sacks et al., 1974). There are explanations 
of accommodation of speech style (Bell, 1997).  Grice‟s interest is the rational 
structure of a conversation, though.  He is interested in how our remarks link up in the 
conversation in terms of their meaning and our reasons for saying what we do. It is 
true that the unity of a conversation may be only partial.  For example, different 
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speakers may attempt to foster different topics (Brown and Yule, 1983: 88-89), but 
Grice can be taken to be working with a kind of ideal.   Grice suggests that it is in our 
interests to cooperate in conversation.  Thus, he speaks of cooperating as something 
“we should not abandon” (Grice, 1989: 29).  Grice‟s appeal to a common purpose or 
accepted direction is an important feature of his theory and is something to which we 
shall return in the next section. 
 
The details of the maxims are contested.  For example, Horn (1984) reduces them to 
three and Sperber and Wilson (1986) do away with the structure of maxims and base 
their theory totally on relevance.  For Sperber and Wilson and in the subsequent 
development of Relevance Theory the notion of relevance provides an account of how 
the mind works to process information.  A recent account of implicature that is 
generally closer to Grice‟s own approach is found in Levinson (2000).  In that work 
Levinson‟s focus is on generalized conversational implicatures, which are 
implicatures that do not depend on particular features of context and operate as a kind 
of default reasoning, which can be defeated by particular features of context. Note 
that he operates with three inferential heuristics for the audience, which are 
counterparts to some of Grice‟s maxims for speakers (Levinson, 2000: 35 ff).  Grice‟s 
own discussion incorporated both generalized and particularized conversational 
implicatures, and should not be interpreted as marginalizing generalized 
conversational implicatures (Levinson, 2000: 18).  A good discussion of the various 
alternatives to Grice‟s scheme of maxims is to be found in Bultinck (2005: 25 ff ). 
 
It is controversial whether the maxims are corollaries of the cooperative principle 
(Lycan, 1984: 75) or merely particular ways of being cooperative (Green, 1996:  95-
96). What follows is a further consideration of the general notion of cooperation that 
is needed for Grice‟s purposes.  For purposes of illustration I shall, where necessary, 
refer to Grice‟s original maxims, but my primary focus is the nature of Grice‟s 
cooperative principle.  While Grice‟s work has been extremely influential, the level of 
importance that is placed specifically on the cooperative principle has diminished in 
favour of a focus on specific maxims or other principles.  Levinson (2000: 14) who is 
closer to Grice‟s view than Relevance Theorists are, for example, does outline Grice‟s 
cooperative principle before moving on to quote the maxims, though there is scant 
mention of the cooperative principle later in the volume.  It is true that the absence 
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could in part be explained by the focus on generalized conversational implicatures, 
which are governed by the specific maxims or heuristics, without the need to appeal 
to the overarching principle.   
  
As explained above, in Grice‟s approach, in order to interpret an implicature the 
audience generally must assume the speaker is cooperating and following the maxims, 
and a variety of authors do not accept that we can make that assumption.  As a 
preliminary to engaging with the issue of cooperation we should note some details of 
Grice‟s position.  He does draw our attention to cases of implicatures in which a 
maxim is being flouted, that is, where the speaker blatantly fails to fulfill the maxim 
for particular effect.  In Grice‟s (1989: 34) example, A, who has just been betrayed by 
X , says, “X is a fine friend.”  This blatantly fails to fulfill the maxim of quality and 
thus A is implicating that he is not a fine friend at all.  Even in that case we could say 
that the maxim has been respected in that it has been exploited to special effect.  
Another case he mentions is where there is a clash of maxims, so that the speaker is 
unable to fulfill one in order to respect another (Grice, 1989: 30).  He also mentions 
the case of violating a maxim, where there is hidden non-cooperation and where the 
audience can be misled (Grice, 1989: 30).  In a situation where you wish to borrow 
my car, ask how it is running and I say, “I have just had it thoroughly checked,” you 
would take me to be implicating that it is in good order.  That depends on you 
supposing I am being cooperative and in particular am following the maxim of 
quantity, which amounts to providing the full amount of information.  In the situation 
in which I know a dangerous fault has just developed, I have deliberately misled you 
by implicature. 
 
In the case of flouting a maxim, the case of maxim clash and the case of violating a 
maxim, Grice takes the audience to assume the speaker is cooperating and is in some 
way respecting the maxims (mistakenly in the last case).  Later I shall mention the 
cases of opting out, which could be described as a refusal to cooperate, on one level at 
least.  In the cases where the audience does assume the speaker is cooperating why 
does she make that assumption?  One reason Grice gives is just that we (mostly) are 
cooperative.  With respect to the maxims he emphasizes, “it is just a well-recognized 
empirical fact that people do behave in these ways.” (Grice, 1989: 29) 
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2. Opposition to the cooperative principle 
 
As already noted, Sperber and Wilson see their principle of relevance as supplanting 
Grice‟s cooperative principle and maxims.  They observe that, “It seems to us to be a 
matter of common experience that the degree of co-operation described by Grice is 
not automatically expected of communicators.”  (Sperber and Wilson, 1986: 162)  
That is the main focus of this section.   
 
There is other opposition to the cooperative principle that can be mentioned briefly. 
Kasher (1977: 115) also supplants the cooperative principle and argues that “all 
theoretical achievements of the theory of conversational implicatures are derivable 
from appropriate applications of the principles of rationality to standard cases of 
linguistic activity.”  Kasher thus develops Grice‟s own emphasis on rationality and 
makes the cooperative principle redundant, and Davies (2000) takes a similar view.  
Sampson (1982) also attacks the cooperative principle and refers to Kasher (1977) 
approvingly.  He works with a parallel between conversations and economic 
transactions.  His view is that in both cases there is evolution of cultural institutions 
through which people can pursue their own aims, and thereby, perhaps unknowingly, 
foster the aims of others.  I shall return later to some situations in which economic 
transactions are literally the focus of conversational interactions.   
 
Let us return to Grice‟s incautious claim that it is an empirical fact that people in 
conversations are usually cooperative and follow the maxims.  This can be attacked 
by focussing on particular unfavourable kinds of situations.  For example, when 
Marie-Odile Taillard (2004: 247) remarks that, “Human communication rests on a 
tension between the goals of communicators and audiences,” we should note that her 
interest is in persuasive communication such as we find in advertising.  She is most 
interested in how the interests of a speaker can be served by not telling the truth and 
thus dismisses the Gricean approach.  “However, as communicators, we behave in a 
way that is most advantageous to ourselves and, at times, this goal is not 
accomplished by providing truthful testimony, but rather by affecting the audience‟s 
attitudes to our own benefit.  (This, by the way, is the main reason why a theory of 
communication cannot be based on a principle of cooperation.)” (Taillard, 2004: 254-
255)  I shall return to the theme of tension between goals later on. 
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Here is another example where a special kind of setting is used to cause trouble for 
Grice‟s claims about cooperation.  Sarangi and Slembrouck (1992) attempt to apply a 
Gricean pragmatic approach to institutional discourse but criticize his view of the 
normality of cooperation.  The moral they seek to draw is that Grice‟s approach needs 
to be broadened to include societal factors such as the social position of the 
communicators.  Sarangi and Slembrouck build on work on power relations by 
Fairclough (1985) and Mey (1987).  One of their cases is that of a postgraduate 
student from a Common Market country seeking free prescriptions in the UK from the 
Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS).  The gist of the situation is that the 
applicant declares he and his spouse are living off money loaned from their parents, 
not regarding that as income, while DHSS rules include that loaned money as income.  
The DHSS communications were minimal and presented on standard forms.   
 
Sarangi and Slembrouck use this as an example of non-cooperation in institutional 
discourse and they use it as evidence against the Gricean claim of the normality of 
cooperation.  Sarangi and Slembrouck (1992: 127) say, “If we are to follow the 
Gricean notion of cooperation, the institution, in such circumstances, would be 
expected to adopt, at least from the client‟s point of view the client‟s goal as its own, 
or act towards negotiating a „mutually accepted goal‟.”  One response to Sarangi and 
Slembrouck and to Taillard is to say that Grice was not intending his account to apply 
to advertising or to institutional discourse.  Indeed, he does restrict himself to 
conversations.  Even so, I believe that if we can handle the full range of conversations 
the same account may be able to be deployed in institutional and advertising settings.  
 
Our main focus in this section is opposition to Grice‟s claim that it is an empirical fact 
that we normally cooperate.  We could separate two claims that Grice makes about 
conversations:  
1. a  claim about the explanation of the use and detection of implicatures: that the 
audience needs to assume the speaker is cooperating in that particular situation 
(and the speaker expects the audience so to assume) 
2. a claim about the nature of conversations: that they are usually cooperative 
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It is possible to attack claim 2 while maintaining claim 1.  Thus we could imagine a 
society in which conversational implicature is not very common but, when it does 
occur, is explained by the required level of cooperativeness in those particular 
circumstances.  This would require that there be some aspects of the setting or 
linguistic performance that indicate that the speaker is probably being cooperative in 
that situation.  There is some evidence of variability in cooperation across societies.  
The Malagasy people do not appear to follow the maxim of quantity, though the best 
interpretation of that is a matter of controversy (Mey, 2001: 76-77).  In the 
conversational settings with which I am familiar, on the other hand, conversational 
implicatures are commonplace and there is a good deal of cooperation of different 
varieties.  Claim 2 has opened Grice up to attack and needs to be modified on the 
basis of further investigation into the nature of cooperation.  Claim 1 is not touched by 
this line of objection.   Grice‟s comments concerning the fact of cooperativeness 
misrepresent the subtlety of his position, for he discusses various ways in which a 
person may fail to follow a maxim, as discussed in section 1. Grice is well aware that 
cooperation is not a straightforward matter.  
 
In cases where there is cooperation, however widespread they are, what is the nature 
of the cooperation to which Grice is alluding?  That is my main topic.  His examples 
show how a speaker can share a common purpose with an audience, as in the case of 
the motorist who is out of petrol.  We could describe the motorist‟s purpose to 
purchase petrol as a practical goal beyond the conversation.  Nevertheless, Grice 
(1989: 29) is well aware that not all conversations are like that and provides examples 
of an over-the-wall chat and quarrelling, where it is much harder to identify that kind 
of common further goal.  This is why he adds to the phrase „a common purpose or set 
of common purposes‟ the further option „or at least a mutually accepted direction‟ 
(Grice, 1989: 26).  The quarreller in Grice‟s theory does not need to share their 
opponent‟s point of view but they do need to stick to the point of the quarrel if they 
are to be understood.  Focussing on the over-the-wall chat and the quarrel can suggest 
the following kind of strategy to defend Grice from the accusation that we are not 
always cooperative.  The strategy is to apply the cooperative principle only to some 
constrained form of cooperation, a kind of cooperation within the conversation, as 
opposed to cooperation generally.  
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For example, Capone (2001) criticizes Asher (1999) for taking Grice‟s Cooperative 
Principle to require that a speaker‟s goal should be taken up by a recipient.  He says, 
“[Asher] fails to understand that Grice‟s Cooperative Principle does not say anything 
about the speaker‟s extra-linguistic goals, but is a theory of the ways in which 
speakers maximize the efficiency of information transfer.” (Capone, 2001: 446-447)   
Grice (1989: 28) does indeed say that his maxims are phrased as if the purpose of talk 
were „the maximally effective exchange of information‟.  Because we rely on our 
audiences to interpret implicatures, we can speak more briefly.  We should not take 
that as fully delimiting the nature of Grice‟s notion of cooperation, though, for he 
goes on to say, “this specification is of course too narrow and the scheme needs to be 
generalized to allow for such general purposes as influencing and directing the actions 
of others.” (Grice, 1989: 28)    The notion of communicative efficiency is an 
important one.  Levinson (2000: 6, 28-29) suggests that in the process of 
communication the task of producing sounds that are distinguishable to an audience 
provides an information bottle-neck and thus there is every motivation to have a 
system of generalized conversational implicatures that allow us to speak more briefly 
for efficiency‟s sake.  We have seen that Grice‟s interest does not stop with 
communicative efficiency, though.  Also we inevitably need to engage with a broader 
kind of cooperation. 
 
In the case of the motorist who is out of petrol, the notion of cooperation that we need 
is precisely one that does relate to extra-linguistic goals.  In order to cooperate, the 
passer-by has to assess the motorist‟s immediate practical goals.  Thinking of the 
maxims can help to underline this point.  When the motorist interprets the passer-by 
to be saying something relevant it is relevant to her immediate extra-linguistic goal of 
purchasing some petrol in the near future.  One conclusion we could draw from this 
kind of example is to say that Capone is wrong to say that Grice‟s cooperative 
principle only applies to linguistic cooperation.  While that is one way of putting it, it 
may be preferable to say that the cooperative principle does indeed only apply to 
linguistic cooperation but in some cases the extra-linguistic goal determines linguistic 
cooperation.  In such cases, what counts as a maximally effective exchange of 
information is relative to that extra-linguistic goal.  This is a reformulation of the 
distinction between linguistic and extra-linguistic goals that is more adequate to the 
facts of communication.  When an extra-linguistic goal determines the linguistic goal 
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it is on the presumption that the goal is shared.  In other cases an extra-linguistic goal 
of one of the participants is clearly not shared by the other and thus it does not 
determine the linguistic goal. 
 
Consider the young man who says to his mother, “I would like to join the army.”  
Amongst the many possible reactions let us consider these two:  
Mother 1: “I will make an appointment for you with a recruiting officer in the 
morning,”   
Mother 2: “I have already lost a husband and two sons to that accursed army.”   
Clearly in the first case the mother is fostering the son‟s stated extra-linguistic goal 
(assuming there is no hidden strategic intent in the utterance) and thus it is this goal 
that guides her conversational contribution.  In the second cases, she implicates that 
she does not support the goal, but even so she is cooperating in the conversation.  We 
could take her to be following the cooperative principle and all of the maxims. Indeed 
that is required for the son to appreciate the implicature, which he very likely would. 
In this case linguistic cooperation is not governed by cooperation with that extra-
linguistic goal.  The goal is to debate the topic, recognizing the presence of conflicting 
opinions.  Speaking of a linguistic goal can be imprecise.  For example, mother and 
son might share the goal of engaging in a conversational act of emotional bonding.  In 
a broad sense that is a linguistic goal, but a narrower sense may be more appropriate. 
 
Amongst cases where there are no common extra-linguistic goals there are ones in 
which no significant extra-linguistic goals enter in to the conversation at all, so the 
issue of them being shared or not does not arise. Grice‟s talk of an over-the-wall chat 
is consistent with this situation.  In such a case, the only kind of cooperation is of a 
linguistic nature.  Clearly, we need to be open to a range of cases displaying variation 
in the form and nature of the cooperation. 
 
Various authors have drawn distinctions between different kinds of cooperation, 
which have been used to constrain the scope of Grice‟s cooperative principle. Green 
(1996: 97-98) points out that Grice (1989: 29) refers to “a second order [common 
aim], namely that each party should, for the time being, identify himself with the 
transitory conversational interests of the other.”  This is a somewhat different 
approach to applying the notion of cooperation in a constrained domain.  Green 
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emphasizes that in order to interpret the remarks of a speaker we have to attribute 
some intention to them in making the remark and thereby have to come to understand 
them.  She goes on to say, “… the purposes which the Cooperative Principle refers to 
are not so much shared or mutual as they are mutually modelled.”  That there is 
mutual modelling conducted by participants in a conversation is both undeniable and 
important but it overstates the case to suggest that Grice‟s cooperative principle is not 
concerned with practical extra-linguistic purposes.  The quote about transitory 
interests concerns just one point in a spectrum of cases, for Grice is saying that even 
in the case of an over-the-wall chat there is some minimal kind of common aim, 
namely to identify with the other‟s topic.  In the case of the motorist who is out of 
petrol we have already seen that the cooperation does involve a more practical 
common purpose.  It is also unwise to build too much on this passage in an exegesis 
of Grice as it is one in which he describes an earlier view of his in which cooperation 
was seen as a quasi-contractual matter, that is, it depended on an implicit agreement to 
cooperate.    
 
Pavlidou (1991: 12) distinguishes between formal cooperation and substantial 
cooperation.   She explains formal cooperation as “cooperation in the Gricean 
tradition, i.e. acting according to the conversational maxims (or against them).”  
Substantial cooperation, in contrast, means “sharing common goals among 
communication partners, goals that go beyond maximal exchange of information.”   
The distinction between formal and substantial cooperation appears broadly similar to 
the distinction between the kinds of cooperation that involve, on the one hand, 
linguistic and, on the other, extra-linguistic goals.  A similar response is due.  It is 
natural to take Pavlidou‟s distinction between formal and substantial cooperation to 
imply that formal cooperation can be defined independently of substantial 
cooperation, for she says, “… formal cooperation does not necessarily imply 
substantial cooperation (or vice versa).” (Pavlidou 1997: 12)  In fact, formal 
cooperation cannot always be determined independently for the reason already given.  
In cases such as Grice‟s motorist case where there is a common practical goal, the 
interpretation of the maxims may be governed by that goal.  We could say that 
linguistic cooperation can expand like an accordion to encompass what has been 
described as „extra-linguistic cooperation‟, in cases where such a common goal guides 
the conversation.  For a somewhat different application of the metaphor of the 
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accordion see Davidson (1980: 55), who follows Feinberg (1965).  In other cases, 
linguistic cooperation has a narrow unexpanded character, as there is no such 
common greater goal.   
 
The distinction between formal and substantial cooperation is important to Pavlidou, 
as she wishes to distinguish between different conversational settings, depending on 
whether they are predominantly cooperative or not.  Thus, she is interested in 
different speech patterns to be found in, for example, faculty meetings and a women‟s 
conference and thus wishes to assess the degree to which the participants share 
common goals. While both settings involve a lot of talk, there are still practical 
actions that need to be coordinated and participants can differ in their goals with 
respect to them.  She discusses syntactic indications of cooperativeness in Greek, 
which is something that can be expanded to a broader range of languages and 
contexts.  Situations of conflicting goals will also be discussed in this article, but in a 
different way. 
 
There are still further terminologies used by other authors to distinguish between a 
broader and a narrower notion of cooperation and their associated goals.  Capone 
(2001) refers to Gu‟s (1999) distinction between communicative and extra-
communicative goals.  Sarangi and Slembrouck (1992: 120) refer to Thomas (1986) 
as distinguishing between the social goal sharing interpretation of cooperation and, as 
they say, the „arguably vacuous notion of linguistic cooperation‟.  Thus Sarangi and 
Slembrouck express reservations about the possibility of a distinction being made 
between linguistic and social goal sharing cooperation.  While not all the distinctions 
made between broader and narrower notions of cooperation need coincide precisely, 
they all appear to be subject to the point I have made: that where there is cooperation 
with a goal that is extra-linguistic, substantial, extra-communicative, or social this 
may determine cooperation within the conversation. 
 
This section has addressed opposition to Grice‟s cooperative principle, mainly based 
on opposition to his claim that speakers normally are cooperative.  It has also looked 
at the strategy of defining a narrower notion of cooperation, and applying Grice‟s 
principle and maxims just to that.  The problem was that where there is cooperation 
with a broader goal it is this goal that appears to determine relevance and so forth in 
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the conversation.  This leads to a new understanding of that kind of distinction, but 
the broad strategy is still helpful in defending Grice‟s cooperative principle, for it 
shows that where there is no extra-linguistic cooperation we can fall back on merely 
linguistic cooperation.  The matter cannot rest there, though, for there are further 
cases which raise issues about the way the cooperative principle applies.   
 
3. Opting Out and Conflicting Interests 
 
Consider the case of a journalist who asks a politician a question that she does not 
wish to answer.  For example, outside the British Prime Minister‟s residence when 
ministerial appointments were being made a press journalist yelled at Ruth Kelly, 
“‟Ere, love, you been sacked?” (Hoggart, 2006), and if she said anything she would 
have replied in essence, “No comment.” Only the Prime Minister announces those 
decisions.  Here the speaker is said to be opting out of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 
1989: 30).  In quieter and more dignified settings politicians are able to decline to 
comment with greater elegance and care.  Clearly, insufficient information has been 
supplied but there is an evident reason for that.  Thus, the speaker in effect 
acknowledges the deficiency while maintaining the general spirit of cooperation and 
indeed she does not violate the other maxims.   
 
A similar case to that of the journalist and politician, but where the clash of goals is 
even more marked, is where a burglar asks, “What is the combination of your safe?” 
and the householder bravely responds, “I shan‟t tell you.”   There is no sign of 
cooperation with respect to extra-linguistic goals in these cases.  The question arises 
as to whether there is cooperation with respect to linguistic goals.  If cooperation is 
understood as just following the maxims then there is not, as the maxim of quantity is 
not satisfied.  Even so, we might feel that the householder is doing what is required of 
them conversationally, for the response is remarkably direct and to the point.   I want 
to place these kinds of cases in the context of a broader range of cases. We should not 
think of cases of opting out as merely exceptions to a general rule, but as one example 
of how participants in conversations handle a degree of conflict of interest.  
 
The speaker who says „no comment‟ is still „playing the game‟ in a certain kind of 
way, while observing a restriction over what they can contribute.  The person who is 
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frank about what they can and cannot contribute is surely doing what minimal 
conversational standards should require.  Certainly, they do not satisfy the 
questioner‟s curiosity, but that is on account of not sharing goals with the questioner.   
 
Cases of opting out, such as the „no comment‟ situation, tend to be cases where the 
speaker and audience have conflicting interests.  We can look at the issue of 
conflicting interests more generally by looking at a further hypothetical case that leads 
to different morals. You wish to buy a used car and are in a car yard speaking to a 
salesperson.  At one level, you are focused on the same goal, a car purchase, but of 
course the two of you have different interests.  You wish to get the best car for the 
least price whereas the salesperson wishes to sell for as much as she can, especially a 
vehicle that would be hard to sell to others.   
 
Here is a case where the nature of the transaction limits the degree or nature of 
cooperation, but the participants have a common interest in striking a deal that is 
mutually agreeable.  It is part of that process that you have different goals and neither 
will fully cooperate to achieve the other‟s goals.  Each expects the other to be 
restrained about revealing their wishes and intentions.  If the salesperson asks, “What 
is the most you would be prepared to pay for a vehicle?” you could be expected to 
fudge and hedge. Similarly, if you ask, “Are there any potential serious problems with 
the vehicle?” we might expect the salesperson to speak carefully, not revealing worst 
fears.  
 
The balance of cooperation and conflict cannot be properly addressed if we were to 
restrict our attention to a narrow notion of cooperation like formal or linguistic 
cooperation.  The shared and conflicting goals both go beyond cooperation in a 
narrow sense as the parties need to cooperate in a serious negotiation with financial 
consequences.  How Grice‟s maxims are followed in order to achieve that result is a 
subtle matter.  Neither party unreservedly wishes to further the other‟s goals and this 
affects the quantity of information and perhaps the quality and may lead to a narrow 
interpretation of relevance.  Nevertheless, they are doing more than sticking to the 
topic in a formalistic way; they are working their way to a mutually agreeable result.   
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In the course of negotiation, the competitive nature of the situation makes itself felt in 
terms of what implicatures the parties would draw from the other‟s remarks.  Suppose 
the salesperson says, “This little Peugeot would suit you perfectly.” Suppose also that 
next to the Peugeot sits the cheapest car in the yard, a Lada.  Would you draw the 
implicature that the Lada is not suitable? One possibility is that you would take the 
salesperson to be implicating that, while not trusting the implicated claim.  Another 
possibility, though, is that you would not draw that implicature, taking the salesperson 
to be silent concerning the Lada, at the level of implicature as well as at the level of 
explicit speech.  We could describe this situation by saying that the salesperson‟s own 
interests will limit the quantity of information she will provide, implicitly as well as 
explicitly. On the other hand, if a knowledgeable friend of yours were to say the same 
thing about the Peugeot, the implicature that the Lada is unsuitable may well be an 
appropriate one to draw and indeed to trust. 
 
In employing these car yard examples I am relying on our common understanding of 
how people interact in such situations, which are common and vivid.  Developing 
such examples could be a prelude to employing a pragmatic theory which 
incorporates the type of social setting into the nature of the speech act.  For example,  
Mey (2001: 221 ff) and Capone (2005) discuss the notion of a pragmeme in which the 
meaning of a speech act is determined jointly by the rules of language and of society.  
Discussing the nature of car yard interactions could well be investigated profitably in 
that kind of framework.  That is not my intention here, though.  The car yard provides 
merely a familiar example and the general point applies across a broad variety of 
cases of interactions where there is conflict of interest.  Similar points could apply to 
very different kinds of bargaining, such as hammering out an agreement concerning 
household chores in a shared living arrangement.  I am suggesting a still greater 
degree of generalization, where we consider conversations involving conflicts of 
interest.  A Gricean approach to pragmatics may not be totally incompatible with a 
societal approach to pragmatics (Turner, 2002).  I want to re-emphasise the place of 
the cooperative principle, without foreclosing connections with other pragmatic 
approaches.  
 
I am supposing that the conversational participants are mutually aware, or at least 
implicitly sense, that there is a conflict of interest and thus adjust their remarks and 
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interpretations of the other‟s remarks accordingly.  This can be understood in terms of 
rationality.  Grice talks of the rationality of cooperation.  Here, what is relevant is the 
rationality of limited cooperation and the rationality of expecting that kind of limited 
cooperation in others.  This basis in rationality does not dispense with the notion of 
cooperation as suggested by Kasher (1977), though, but rather emphasizes the way we 
need to be sensitive to situations of limited cooperation. 
 
My emphasis on the speaker and audience having a sense of there being a conflict of 
interest presumably could be incorporated into some kind of approach in which the 
notion of relevance is central.  An intepretation of the recommendation of the Peugot 
as implicating that the Lada was not suitable might be recognized as relevant if the 
utterance was that of a friend and not relevant when it was that of a salesperson.  My 
claim, though, is that such recognition of relevance would depend on sensitivity to the 
situation as one of conflicting interests.  Relevance Theory has sidelined the 
cooperative principle and thus talk of sensitivity to situations of conflict of interest 
that qualify the extent of cooperation is out of line with the way the theory has been 
presented.  What it would need to do is describe how the cognitive environments of 
the speaker and audience incorporate the nature of these conflict of interest situations 
in such a way as to suitably affect the communicative intentions of the speaker and 
the drawing of inferences by the audience.  Sperber and Wilson (1986: 121) do claim 
as a virtue of their use of relevance that it is consistent with „keeping secret something 
it would be relevant to the audience to know‟.  I am interested in when that occurs and 
when it does not.  
 
Some authors might describe a situation involving the salesperson‟s utterance 
described above as one in which the maxim of quantity has been suspended (Thomas 
1995: 76-8).  While that is one possible description, my treatment tends to normalize 
that situation to a greater extent. Dealing with a degree of conflict of interest is 
familiar in a wide range of situations. Incidentally, it is certainly not true that the 
maxim of quantity is suspended for the whole interaction.  If you were to ask, “Does it 
have air bags and ABS brakes?” and the salesperson said, “It has air bags,” you would 
take her to be implicating that it did not have ABS brakes.  That form of implicature 
has also been described as a clausal implicature and functions as a pattern of default 
reasoning, which makes it count as a generalized conversational implicature (Grice, 
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1989: 37; Gazdar, 1979; Levinson, 2000: 36).  Generalized conversational 
implicatures can be cancelled by features of the context, though, and if the maxim of 
quantity had been suspended more generally through the interaction that should have 
been enough to cancel that generalized implicature.  
 
I have been focusing especially on conversations in which there is a degree of trust 
between the parties, but with limits.  I am not trading on the crude stereotype of the 
used car salesperson as a rogue and a confidence trickster.  The situation depends just 
on the reality of a degree of conflict of interest between salesperson and the 
purchaser.   It is my belief that, in spite of that conflict of interest, the degree of 
cooperation is sufficient to entertain the possibility of implicatures with a Gricean 
explanation.     
 
4. Unhelpful speakers 
 
We have looked at opting out situations where there were conflicts of interest.  We 
have also seen a bargaining example, which provides a further illustration of conflict 
of interest.  In this section we shall look at cases of unhelpful speakers, which could 
perhaps be described in terms of conflict of interest too.  There, the speaker‟s interest 
lies in conserving time and effort, a matter which concerns pragmatics generally.  
 
In a crowded train station, you ask an overstretched employee, “When is the next train 
to Newtown?” and they respond brusquely, “There are no more trains to Newtown 
today.” Let us suppose that there are other possibilities that could have been 
mentioned: taking a bus to another station and then a train, or taking the train at five 
past midnight.  In this situation, I want to suppose, the employee is providing a literal 
and machine-like response and so is not cooperating in the full sense that interests 
Grice most.  If the audience appreciates that, then they will not take the speaker to be 
implicating that there are no other alternatives involving trains in the near future.  
While there is less than full cooperation, there is reasonable performance under the 
headings of quality, relevance and manner.  Would it be correct to describe this case 
as one in which there is merely formal or linguistic cooperation and not substantial 
cooperation?  That may be tempting but is not fully accurate as the utterance can be 
criticized with respect to the quantity maxim.  If we were to take Pavlidou‟s account 
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of formal cooperation strictly this means that there is not even formal cooperation in 
this situation.  It makes better sense to say that there is a reduced level of cooperation.  
Of course, in a different situation, where the speaker is a painstakingly helpful friend 
saying exactly the same thing, it would be appropriate to take them to be implicating 
that there is no way of getting to Newtown by train in the near future.  The audience 
could correctly reason that if there had been some alternative she would have said so. 
 
I have presented this case as one with a reduced level of cooperation owing to work 
pressure, but there would be similar cases where a passer-by simply feels unmotivated 
to help and gives minimal responses.  This can lead to misunderstanding, where the 
audience implicitly reasons, “If there were a better way they would have said so,” but 
often enough we recognize an unhelpful manner and do not draw much from terse 
responses.  While Grice does not dwell on cases of unhelpful speakers, he shows 
awareness of a range of cases in which cooperation is limited or does not obtain.  
 
Now we have considered various kinds of conversations involving conflicting 
interests we can return briefly to the cases of advertising and institutional discourse.  
In both cases there are clearly conflicting interests, but not ones so thoroughgoing as 
to undermine effective communication.  The advertiser attempts to convey a high 
opinion of the product or service and you as the audience appreciate the biased nature 
of the perspective.  Implicatures can be detected and they can depend on a level of 
cooperation.  The advertiser understands your goal of having clean clothes at an 
economical price, for example.  But a discerning audience retains a lively scepticism 
about both explicit and implicit claims.  Similarly, in the example of institutional 
discourse from Sarangi and Slembrouck, described earlier, the postgraduate student 
might expect the DHSS to be cautious in its financial dealings with applicants, and 
not make favourable judgements too readily.  In this case it may be that we should not 
so much regard the DHSS as literally having its own interests, but we can say it has an 
interest in operating a fair and even handed policy towards all applicants.  One would 
like to think even handedness could be combined with a degree of flexibility.  Thus in 
this situation we don‟t have the two parties straightforwardly sharing an extra-
linguistic interest, nor do we merely have them cooperating at a narrow linguistic 
level, but rather we have them jointly engaging in an extra-linguistic project, one in 
which there is a kind of conflict of interest. 
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I have now covered various kinds of cases in which the speaker‟s cooperation with 
regard to extra-linguistic goals is limited in ways that an audience, with luck, can 
appreciate and this modifies their reading of implicatures.  In this way, an audience‟s 
assumption of cooperation is qualified by their assessment of the interests and degree 
of helpfulness of the speaker.  The maxims are related to the cooperative principle and 
consequently the maxims should also be understood in this kind of qualified way.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
I have conducted an investigation into Grice‟s cooperative principle and I have noted 
how authors have objected to his claim that, as a matter of fact, speakers are usually 
cooperative in conversations.  I have discussed the strategy of restricting the 
application of the principle to cooperation of a narrower nature, linguistic or formal 
cooperation.  That kind of distinction needs to be reformulated for, in cases where 
there is a shared extra-linguistic goal, that shared goal can determine the nature of the 
cooperation required.  Even so, the strategy is helpful for it shows how, in cases 
where there is no shared extra-linguistic goal, implicatures can be understood on the 
basis of narrowly linguistic cooperation.  The cooperative principle still faces 
challenges in cases where there is a conflict of interest between the conversational 
participants.  In cases of opting out, a narrow view of linguistic cooperation based on 
Grice‟s maxims does not do justice to the way that it may be perfectly understandable 
and acceptable for someone to speak with discretion.  In cases where there is a level 
of cooperation with a common extra-linguistic goal there may simultaneously be 
limitations to cooperation on account of conflicting interests.  This means that the 
cooperation is of a constrained nature and that affects the implicatures that are 
intended and drawn.  This requires the speaker and, especially, the audience to be 
sensitive to a context of conflicting interests. My recommendation is to bring the 
cooperative principle back more to centre stage while allowing that conversational 
participants need to be sensitive to limitations on cooperation in a range of situations.  
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